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Brussels, 28 April 2020
V#ra Jourová
Vice-President of the European Commission for Values and Transparency
Didier Reynders
European Commissioner for Justice
Dear Honourable Members of the European Commission,
We are writing to you in respect of the worsening breakdown of the rule of law in
Poland, as well as specifically in regard to actions that must be taken ahead of the
upcoming presidential election and election of the First President of the Supreme
Court.
Rather than further detailing the main aspects of the persistent deterioration of the
rule of law situation in Poland ever since the European Commission activated the
Rule of Law Framework in January 2016, which have been comprehensively detailed
in your own Article 7(1) reasoned proposal of December 2017 and most recently by
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in January 2020, we are writing
to ask you to please answer the following questions:
(1)  When can we expect the European Commission to launch an infringement
action against the “muzzle law” which entered into force on 14 February 2020, which
organised an unprecedented structural violation of judicial independence standards
laid down in EU law as well as unprecedented system of punishment for judges who
dare enforcing EU judicial independence standards?
(2)  When will the European Commission act to sanction Polish authorities’ refusal to
comply with the Court of Justice’s A. K. preliminary ruling of 19 November 2019?
(3)  When will the European Commission apply for financial sanctions following
Polish authorities’ public refusal to immediately and fully comply with the Court of
Justice’s interim relief order of 8 April 2020 in respect of the so-called “disciplinary
chamber”, and the violation of this order committed directly by the same “disciplinary
chamber” when it referred the Court of Justice’s interim relief order to the captured
“Constitutional Tribunal”, which, according to your own Article 7(1) TEU diagnosis,
can no longer be considered a court due to its illegal composition and the unlawful
appointment of its current “President”?
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(4)  When will the European Commission launch an infringement action in respect
of the unlawful actions of the so-called “Constitutional Tribunal”, the latest examples
of which are its two “judgments” which essentially nullify, in obvious violation
of both Polish and EU law, the resolution of the Supreme Court of 23 January
2020 which aimed to guarantee the effectiveness of EU law and in particular
compliance with EU judicial independence standards following the Court of Justice’s
A. K. preliminary ruling of 19 November 2019? In these two “decisions”, farcically
relying in part on the EU Treaties to absurdly justify blatant violations of the said
Treaties, the “Constitutional Tribunal” not only defiantly violated its obligation to
refer the matter to the ECJ, it blatantly violated the most fundamental principles and
mechanisms underlying the whole EU legal order by deliberately ignoring relevant
ECJ rulings; denying the ECJ any authority to review Polish measures violating
judicial independence; and prohibiting national courts from setting aside and/or
referring questions to the ECJ regarding bodies and/or national measures which
patently violate the principle of effective legal protection. This amounts to Polexit
from the EU legal order in all but name and total anarchy is bound to follow if no
decisive action is taken against a body which the Commission itself has already
found to be illegally composed.
(5)  When will the European Commission also launch an infringement action against
another body masquerading as a court known as the Extraordinary Control and
Public Affairs Chamber (ECPA)? In this context, we would like to know whether
the Commission intends to take any action in relation to the preliminary cases
C-487/19 (concerning judge Waldemar #urek), C-508/19 (concerning judge Monika
Fr#ckowiak), and C-824/18 (raising i.a. questions about the composition of the
ECNJ-suspended – soon to be expelled – National Council of the Judiciary)? A
common feature of the abovementioned cases is that all of them relate to the legal
status of individuals appointed to the ECPA chamber which is as blatantly defective
as the “disciplinary chamber”, which was already found not to constitute a court
within the meaning of Polish and EU Law;
(6)  When will the European Commission likewise launch an infringement action
against the ENCJ-suspended – and soon to be expelled – National Council for the
Judiciary in light of its active role when it comes to the deliberate violation of EU
judicial independence standards?
We are sorry to have to write to you in such an urgent manner, but time is of the
essence. As some of the most renowned professors of EU law specialising in rule of
law matters wrote to you on 9 March 2020,
Waiting to bring infringement actions and to fail to simultaneously seek
interim measures when the rule of law in a Member State is so obviously
and blatantly deteriorating on an industrial scale only means that the
Commission faces a far more serious and intractable problem to deal with
later. The problem does not disappear by ignoring it. This is an urgent
moment for action. […] This is not merely a clear and present danger as far
as the Polish legal order is concerned but represents an existential threat
to the functioning of the EU’s interconnected legal system as a whole. […]
If the Commission does not act, then Member States (and other) judiciaries
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will have to act to defend themselves by withdrawing judicial cooperation
with the Polish judiciary and ultimately, failing to recognise and enforce the
decisions of Polish courts. To prevent further unravelling of the EU’s core
legal system, it is imperative for the Commission to act without delay. 
Poland’s ruling party is about to capture the whole Supreme Court while an unfair
and not free presidential election is due to take place at the peak of the COVID-19
pandemic in a broader context where, in the first time of the history of the EU legal
order, a ruling and an interim relief order of the European Court of Justice are openly
ignored and judges punished for seeking to apply the Court of Justice’s case law.
This is why we feel we have no choice but to write to you and urge you to take
immediate actions as regards each of the critical issues listed above before it is too
late.
In annex, you will find additional information and suggestions regarding the “Muzzle
Law” and the importance of preliminary cases C-387/19, C-508/19 and C-824/18.
We remain at your disposal should you need any additional information and we
thank you for your time.
Yours truly,
The Open Dialogue Foundation (ODF, Poland/Belgium)
with:
Prof. Alberto Alemanno, HEC Paris
Association of Administrative Courts Judges (OSSSA, Poland)
Prof. Gráinne de Búrca, New York University
Civil Development Forum (FOR, Poland)
Prof. Paul Craig, University of Oxford
Dr Tom Gerald Daly, Melbourne School of Government
Defend Democracy (Belgium)
Forum for Cooperation of Judges (FWS, Poland)
Prof. Kees Groenendijk, Radboud University Nijmegen
Dr Joelle Grogan, Middlesex University London
Prof. Gábor Halmai, European University Institute
Hungarian Europe Society
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Prof. R. Daniel Kelemen, Rutgers University
Prof. Dimitry Kochenov, Groningen University
Dr Kriszta Kovács, WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Dr Jacek Kucharczyk, President, Institute of Public Affairs (ISP, Poland)
Lex Super Omnia Association of Prosecutors (LSO, Poland)
Prof. John Morijn, Groningen University
Prof. Laurent Pech, Middlesex University London
Prof. Vlad Perju, Boston College
Prof. Sébastien Platon, University of Bordeaux
Prof. Jorrit Rijpma, Leiden University
Prof. Theo de Roos, University of Tilburg
Prof. Wojciech Sadurski, University of Sydney
Themis Association of Judges (Poland)
Anthony Zacharzewski, President, Democratic Society (UK)
Prof. Fryderyk Zoll, Jagiellonian University
ANNEX: Two suggested key steps
Step one: Launch of infringement action against the so-called “Muzzle Law”
On February 14, 2020, the so-called “Muzzle Law” – a comprehensive legal act
amending, among others, the act on the organization of common courts, the act on
the Supreme Court, and the act on the National Council of the Judiciary entered
into force. This act is the crowning achievement of the 4-year long violations of
the Constitution as well as the basic legal obligations deriving from membership of
both the EU and the Council of Europe, aimed at total political subordination of the
judiciary and the change of the model of the state system from the rule of law to
authoritarian. The most important changes introduced by the “Muzzle Law” include:
–         introduction of a new type of disciplinary torts of judges, according to which
a judge’s question for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU regarding the status of
judges appointed with the participation of the neo NCJ is a serious disciplinary tort
threatened with the penalty of expulsion from profession,
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–         depriving the judicial self-government bodies of any importance (e.g. they lost
the right to give opinions on candidates for judges and candidates for senior judicial
positions, as well as the right to issue critical opinions on changes in the organization
of justice),
–         politicizing the new mode of disciplinary proceedings against judges to an
even greater extent than before (e.g. the decision to waive the judge’s immunity and
arrest of a judge was transferred to the exclusive competence of the Disciplinary
Chamber of the Supreme Court which is contrary to the Constitution with the
Disciplinary Chamber itself found not to constitute a court by application of the ECJ
preliminary ruling of 19 November 2019),
–         imposing an obligation on judges to disclose information on membership of
judicial associations, which will be publicly available on the Internet,
–         granting, in a manner contrary to the constitution, to the President of the
Republic of Poland the right to correct – by handing a judge’s nomination – the
defectiveness of the procedure for appointing a judge,
–         facilitating the ruling camp’s political subordination of the future First President
of the Supreme Court, after the term of office of the current President – prof.
Ma#gorzata Gersdorf will expire in April 2020, e.g. by granting each judge of the
Supreme Court the right to nominate a candidate, reducing the quorum sufficient
for election during the Assembly of Judges, or authorizing the President of the
Republic of Poland to elect an interim president of the Supreme Court for election (it
is significant that all these solutions were applied earlier, during the political takeover
of the position of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal),
–         granting to the Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs Chamber of the
Supreme Court, appointed in full ab initio by the neo National Council of the
Judiciary, exclusive competence to assess the correctness of judicial appointments,
Most of the changes listed above are in conflict with both the Polish Constitution
and the standards of ECHR and EU law. On the one hand, the “Muzzle Law” is a
very serious threat to maintaining the independence of the Polish judiciary (since it
incapacitates the judicial self-government and enables the political subordination of
the future First President of the Supreme Court), and on the other hand, it prevents
judges of common courts and the Supreme Court from implementing the judgment of
the CJEU of November 19, 2019 (since questioning the status of judges appointed
with the participation of the neo NCJ has become a disciplinary tort, and only the
Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs Chamber, which all “judges” were appointed
with the participation of the neo NCJ, is entitled to examine their status).
Finally, the "Muzzle Law", which is a reaction of the Polish government to the ruling
of the CJEU of 19 November 2019, has, among others, the effect of preventing
Polish courts from submitting requests for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, which
violates the principles of loyal cooperation, direct effect and primacy of EU law in
addition of course to violating Article 267 TFEU itself.
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Step two:  Prioritise the examination of cases C-487/19, C-508/19, and C-824/18
by all possible procedural means
A common feature of the abovementioned cases is that all of them relate to the
legal status of judges of the Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs Chamber of
the Supreme Court. It should be added that all judges of this Chamber, like the
judges of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, were appointed with
the participation of the neo NCJ, whose 15 members-judges were elected by the
Parliament in violation of Art. 187 of the Constitution.
Moreover, in the light of the justification of the Supreme Court’s judgment of
December 5, 2019, reference number act III PO 7/18, and resolution of the Supreme
Court of January 23, 2020 reference number BSA I-4110-1 / 20, which were issued
on the basis of the indications contained in the CJEU judgment of 19 November
2019 (in joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/19 ), the current National
Council of the Judiciary does not provide sufficient guarantees of independence
from legislative and executive authorities, and thus does not meet the requirements
arising for such an authority under EU law.
In addition, the procedure for appointing new Supreme Court judges was also
defective because the presidential announcement of the competition for their
positions was made without the countersignature of the Prime Minister which is
required by the Constitution, and the persons participating in the competition were
deprived of the possibility of effective judicial review of the NCJ resolutions on the
selection of candidates. This causes an obvious and fundamental defect in the
appointment of the judges of the Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs Chamber,
who – until the doubts related to the procedure for their appointment are resolved –
should be removed from adjudication, as well as from participation in the collegial
bodies of the Supreme Court, including in the assembly, which will elect the future
First President of the Supreme Court.
It should be emphasized that the suspension of 20 judges of the Extraordinary
Control and Public Affairs Chamber is a very urgent issue, because otherwise,
together with the other judges of the Supreme Court elected by the neo KRS (of
which 10 sit in the Disciplinary Chamber, and 7 in the Civil Chamber) they will be
able to appoint one of 5 candidates for the position of First President of the Supreme
Court, as the successor of Professor Gersdorf. In this case, President Duda will
certainly indicate the very candidate who will guarantee strict political subordination
to the ruling camp. As the example of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal indicates,
filling most judicial positions and the position of First President will be sufficient
to subject the highest Polish judicial body to strict political control. This situation
will be tantamount to the fall of the Supreme Court as the last symbol of judicial
independence in Poland, and in addition, the bodies of the European Union will be
deprived of a partner who ensures proper and uniform interpretation of European
Union law in Poland (the best example of which is the resolution of the combined
chambers of the Supreme Court of 23 January 2020).
Secondly, a situation in which incorrectly elected judges of the Extraordinary Control
and Public Affairs Chamber have the right to adjudicate, it is not possible to comply
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properly with the judgment of the CJEU of 19 November 2019 (in joined cases
C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/19). This is due to the fact that, according to the
“Muzzle Law” referred to at the beginning of this appeal, only the Extraordinary
Control and Public Affairs Chamber is authorized to examine the correctness of
judicial appointments, including those made with the participation of the neo NCJ.
Considering that all judges of the Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs Chamber
were elected with the participation of the neo NCJ, they obviously have a personal
interest in legalizing the status of judges appointed with its participation. Pursuant
to the principle of "nemo iudex in causa sua" in force since Roman law, none of
the judges of this chamber should rule on the status of judges elected with the
participation of the neo NCJ, which, however, was not prevented by 7 judges from
this chamber on 8 January 2020 (and so even before the entry into force of the
“Muzzle Law”) of the resolution on case number I NOZP 3/19, in which by granting
the decisive significance of the ceremony of handing the judge’s nomination by the
President, they de facto decided in their favour the legality of their status as judges
of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the withdrawal from the possibility of adjudicating and participating in the
collegial bodies of the Supreme Court of the judges of the Extraordinary Control and
Public Affairs Chamber will also prevent the possibility of defective election of judges
of this chamber to assess the validity of presidential elections, which the executive
power seeks to unlawfully conduct in May 2020. Under the Act on the Supreme
Court, which entered into force in 2018, it is the newly established Extraordinary
Control and Public Affairs Chamber that has exclusive competence to assess the
validity and legality of nationwide elections and referendums, including presidential
elections.
Electoral law authorities raise a number of allegations against the possibility of
holding the presidential election in May 2020, in conditions of a pandemic, even if it
would be correspondence elections. The most important are:
–         conducting elections in conditions that justify the introduction of a
constitutional state of natural disaster (Article 228 (1) of the Constitution), which
prevents them from being held until after 90 days after the end of this state,
–         provisions introducing correspondence voting procedures for all voters
participating in the presidential elections were adopted by the Sejm as a matter of
urgency, which violates Art. 123 (1) of the Constitution, and their adoption less than
6 months before the scheduled date of elections is inconsistent with the case-law of
the Constitutional Tribunal,
–         conducting correspondence elections in the manner set out in the bill
submitted by the ruling camp violates the provisions of Art. 127 (1) rules for the
universality and secrecy of elections, since voters in foreign circuits and those in
quarantine will not be able to participate in practice, and personal data should be
attached to the envelope along with the voting card,
–         preparing and conducting, within a few days after the eventual entry into force
of the relevant provisions, elections in the form of correspondence by a state that
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has no experience in such form of voting in a way that will not violate democratic
standards is simply impossible, especially since the National Electoral Commission
has been excluded from its preparation,
–         due to restrictions introduced in connection with the pandemic, including
regarding the freedom of assembly, the constitutional principle of equality of
elections was also violated, as the only candidate who is able to effectively conduct
the election campaign is the current president – supported by the ruling camp
Andrzej Duda, who is intensively promoted by the state media, which are not even
trying to maintain neutrality and objectivity.
The conduct of universal nationwide elections in pandemic conditions was very
critically assessed by the head of the OSCE Office, who in her statement of April
7, 2020 stated that preventing the campaign from being conducted during the
pandemic in conjunction with the correspondence voting introduced shortly before
the elections raises serious concerns for fair voting and preserving democratic
standards. In turn, according to the resolution of the European Parliament adopted
on April 17, 2020, the preparations of the Polish government to hold elections during
the pandemic are "completely incompatible with European values" and also "may
threaten the lives of Polish citizens and undermine the concept of free, equal, direct
and secret elections, referred to in the Polish constitution."
It should be emphasized that the Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs Chamber
has already proved its political availability to the ruling camp in electoral matters,
when in the decision of 6 April 2020 reference number I NSW 11/20 dismissed the
complaint of a person who wanted to register in the presidential election, however –
as it appears from his complaint – due to the outbreak of the coronavirus, he was not
able to collect enough signatures of citizens for his candidacy. Initially, the complaint
was upheld by a judge from the Labour Chamber, who ruled on the case because
of refraining from adjudicating judges of the Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs
Chamber in connection with the content of the resolution of the joint chambers of the
Supreme Court of January 23, 2020, however, after reviewing the appeal against
this decision, three judges of the Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs Chamber
stated that "the introduction of an epidemic state is not the same as the introduction
of an emergency state, which is associated with the limitation of electoral rights."
This circumstance clearly indicates that the judges of the Extraordinary Control and
Public Affairs Chamber do not consider the state of the pandemic to be a significant
obstacle in the electoral process, and their possible control of the legality of future
elections will not be an audit by an independent and impartial court.
Increasingly, the Polish government’s desire to conduct presidential elections at
any cost in a pandemic is seen as the next phase of a creeping coup d’état, which
began with the President’s refusal to swear in three properly selected Constitutional
Tribunal judges, and its subsequent manifestations were the establishment of the
unconstitutional neo NCJ, an attempt purge in the Supreme Court, as well as a
number of changes in the structure of common courts, including the politicization of
disciplinary proceedings against judges. As part of the same plan aiming at violating
democracy and the rule of law in Poland and introducing the authoritarian system,
one should also consider the “Muzzle Law”, the introduction of which directly violates
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the principles of loyalty, direct effectiveness and primacy of European law. The
implementation of this plan is tantamount to a gross violation of legal standards
arising from European treaties (Article 2 and Article 19 TEU, Articles 11, 47, 48,
49 EUCFR) and a breakdown of the integrity of the European Union. Moreover,
the attitude of the Polish government indicates that it does not intend to respect
European law and the CJEU rulings, as evidenced by the fact that the Supreme
Court Disciplinary Chamber continued to operate, despite the judgment of the Polish
Supreme Court of December 5, 2019, and the resolution of the combined chambers
of the Supreme Court of 23 January 2020 unequivocally stating that it is not a court
both within the meaning of Polish law and European law. The best evidence of
this is the unfounded and issued in gross violation of the procedure decision of the
Disciplinary Chamber of 4 February 2020 to suspend the performance of the duties
of Judge Pawe# Juszczyszyn due to his judicial decision, which implemented the
guidelines contained in the judgment of the CJEU of November 19, 2019.
The lack of a decisive reaction of the European Union bodies to such an advanced
breach of European law standards carries a serious risk of introducing similar
pseudo-reforms also in other European countries, especially the countries of the
former "Eastern Bloc". Urgent action by the European Commission described in
this appeal corresponds to the function of the Commission as a "guardian of the
European treaties" and is even necessary to prevent irreversible changes that
will de facto exclude Poland from the circle of European legal culture and western
democracy.
To co-sign this open letter, please leave a comment with your name and affiliation! 
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